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INEQUALITY IN REAL PROPERTY TAX REVIEW
ADOLPH KOEPPEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
A taxpayer in New York State may judicially challenge a real propertyassess-
ment on any of the grounds provided by statute-illegality, overvaluation,
and inequality.' Although these grounds are stated in the alternative, except in
the rare instance where the assessing body values real property at its fair market
value, no taxpayer may successfully challenge his assessment without resolving
the issue of inequality.
It is not practicably feasible to reassess real property within any taxing
unit on an annual basis. Couple this with rising sales prices since the end of
World War II and one finds that real property assessments are invariably lower
than the fair market value of any particular parcel of real estate. While the
difference between assessed value and fair market value may increase with each
passing year neither value by itself is germane to a challenge of a property
assessment. The significant number in such a challenge is the rate of assessment
which is the ratio of the assessed value to the fair market value. The taxpayer
must establish such a ratio during the trial. Once a finding of ratio is made by
the court, it is then multiplied by the fair market value of the property as found
by the trial court to arrive at the judicially correct assessed value of the real
property.
This article will discuss various aspects of inequality in real property tax
proceedings. Special attention will be given to the appropriate statutes, partic-
ularly section 720.3 of the RPTL as amended in 1969, a review of the judicial
process in inequality proceedings, and a prognosis for inequality trials in New
York.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The New York State Legislature is vested with power to "provide for
supervision, review and equalization for purposes of taxation."'2 The only
limitation is that "assessments shall in no case exceed full value,"3 a proscription
which the Legislature endorsed by providing that "all real property in each
assessing unit shall be assessed at the full value thereof." 4 As evidenced by the
continued enactment of RPTL section 720.3 and its predecessors, the courts
have historically accepted a uniform percentage of market value as being the
legal equivalent of full value.5
* Member of New York Bar; LL.B., 1948, LL.M., 1953, New York University.
1. REAL PROPERTY TAx LAW § 706 (McKinney 1960) [hereinafter cited as RPTL].
2. N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 2.
3. Id.
4. RPTL § 306.
5. Mid-Island Shop. Plaza, Inc. v. Podeyn, 25 Misc. 2d 972, 204 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct.
1960), aff'd 14 A-D.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1961), aff'd 10 N.Y.2d 966, 180 N.E.2d 63,
224 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1961); Yaras v. Kinnaw, 303 N.Y. 224, 101 N.E.2d 474 (1951); Warren
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Section 720.3 of the RPTL provides the sole method of proof on the trial
of inequality of assessments and limits the evidence that can be introduced.
The parties shall mutually agree on the parcels to be appraised
and the number of witnesses to be heard with respect to such issue.6
This presupposes that both sides have selected parcels that each one wishes to
be appraised for these purposes. An attempt is to be made by the parties to
mutually agree as to a total combined list of parcels which shall then be ap-
praised by both sides. The taxpayer will, of course, select substantial properties
with low ratios of assessed value to market value. The respondent's list will
rationally contain similar properties with high ratios. Needless to say, mutual
agreement seems to be a vain expectation, and the law provides:
In the event the parties fail to agree on such parcels or on the
number of witnesses, upon application of either party the court or
referee shall select the parcels to be appraised without reference to
their assessed values, or shall determine the number of witnesses, or
both, as the case may be ....
v. Carter, 109 N.Y. 576, 17 N.E. 222 (1888); Connolly v Board of Assessors, 32 A.D.2d 106,
300 N.Y.S.2d 192 (2d Dep't 1969); C.H.O.B. Associates v. Nassau County Board of
Assessors, 45 Misc. 2d 184 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd 22 A.D.2d 1015, 256 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1964),
aff'd 16 N.Y.2d 779, 209 N.E.2d 820, 262 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1965).
6. RPTL § 720.3 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
7. Id. Is the court restricted to the total assessment of each of the selected parcels or
may a finding of ratio lawfully be made from land assessments as separate and distinct from
total assessments?
In People ex rel. Strong v. Hart, 216 N.Y. 513, 111 N.E. 56 (1916), the Court of Ap-
peals laid down the rule. The taxpayer pointed to what is now section 502(3) of the Real
Property Tax Law, which reads:
The assessment roll shall contain a column for the entry with respect to each
separately assessed parcel of the assessed valuation of the land exclusive of any
improvements, followed by a column for the entry of the total assessed valuation.
Only the total assessment, however, shall be subject to judicial review provided by
article seven of this chapter. N.Y. REA. PROP. TAx LAw § 502(3) (McKinney 1960).
He urged that he be allowed to introduce evidence of land values of property of like
character (see discussion of stratification in text, p. 579 infra) to compare with the value of
his land.
The Court of Appeals held:
Here we find provision made for two items in the assessment roll relating to
real property, the one embracing the land alone; the other embracing the land and
the buildings on it. There is nothing in either provision indicating on the part of
the legislature to the effect that, when a comparison thereafter comes to be made
in court in order to ascertain whether equality in the assessment has been observed,
such comparison will be confined to one of these items instead of being permitted
as to both. In my opinion, the law leaves the property owner claiming to be ag-
grieved by inequality in the assessment of his real property at liberty to attack the
assessment by comparing the gross valuation placed upon his property with the
gross valuation of other similar property upon the assessment roll; and he is also
at liberty to compare the assessed valuation placed upon his land alone with the
values placed upon the land only in the case of other properties of like character
and situation. I can find no restriction in the law which forbids the aggrieved tax-
payer from resorting to either method. People ex rel. Strong v. Hart, Id. at 520, 111
N.E. at 58 (emphasis added).
The Strong case appears to have been totally overlooked by practitioners in the past.
Currently, attorneys for the Empire State Building are attacking its assessment by the Tax
Commissioners of the City of New York. The Strong rationale is being tested in this trial
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Failure to agree casts the burden on the court (or referee) to make the selection
of the parcels. Customarily the court will select an equal number of parcels at
random from each side's list to make a combined list.
The appraisal of parcels of real property is expensive, since they must b6
made in accordance with the acceptable standards of valuation utilized in the
courts in valuation proceedings. All three of the traditional valuation methods,
summation approach, market data, and income approach must be considered in
each appraisal. The economics of the main valuation proceeding will usually
limit the number of parcels on each list and this in turn will determine the
number of parcels selected by the court. The statute does not preclude the
court from making an independent selection without reference to either list;
however, practical considerations aside, there is no reported case where such
a judicial prerogative has been exercised.
After the parcels have been selected each of the parties will have them
appraised by his witnesses and the results must be filed with both the court and
the other party.8 The statutory directive is noteworthy mainly because it pro-
vided for exchange of appraisals in a valuation proceeding long before such
methods became standard procedure in condemnation and tax review trials.
At this point the formal trial begins.
The parties shall be limited in their proof on the trial of such
issue to such parcels and witnesses, except that in any event, whether
or not parcels are selected as hereinabove provided, evidence may be
given by either party as to (1) actual sales of real property within the
assessing unit that occurred during the year in which the assessment
under review was made and (2) the state equalization rate established
for the roll containing the assessment under review.9
The language in italics was provided by the 1969 amendments. Prior to this
and could have a great impact on tax assessment trials in the future.
In Wien v. Tax Commissioners, Special Term, New York County, (New York Law
journal p. 16, col. 3, Dec. 17, 1968), the taxpayer sought an order "directing that they
may limit their proposed selection of parcels to be appraised under section 720(3) of the
Real Property Tax Law . . . to parcels wherein the land is of like character to the land
under review and may limit their appraisals thereof to land values only." Id. at 16. See
note 52 infra for New York City statutory authorization for such a procedure. The taxpayer
was not seeking the selection of the sample parcels under section 720(3) at this time, but
cited Strong v. Hart as authority for their request. Special Term denied the motion and
referred it to the trial court with these words:
... If petitioners desire to limit themselves to land values alone, based upon their
understanding of the controlling law, so be it. Their action certainly will not limit
respondent to a consideration of land values alone (either with respect to the same
parcels selected by petitioners or others), absent agreement on the question, cer-
tainly will not limit the trial court in its fnal selection of sample parcels, if the
absence of agreement on parcels requires a judicial selection .... Id. at 16.
8. Id.
Before any testimony is given by either party as to the value of such parcels,
each party shall simultaneously file with the court or referee, on a date fixed
by the court or referee, a written statement of tabulation of the appraised values
placed upon such parcels by the witnesses of the respective parties, and each
party shall serve on the other at the same time a copy of such statement or
tabulation of values stated by his witnesses.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
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time, the statute suggested that the selected parcel method of proof was
mandatory (in absence of any agreement to the contrary) in every case but
that either party could introduce evidence as to actual sales and the equaliza-
tion rate.
Section 720 and its predecessors have long permitted evidence as to actual
sales in addition to that offered by the selected parcel method. The 1969 amend-
ment represents the latest step in the debate between the Legislature, which
favors admission of the equalization rate, and Judge Fuld who opposes admis-
sion. The controversy was first scored in 1951 when the equalization rate was
introduced into evidence at an inequality trial. In People ex rel. Yaras v. Kinnaw,
the Court of Appeals rejected its introduction stating:
While there is a certain superficial resemblance between 'in-
equality' and 'equalization'--for both have reference to the relation
between assessed values and full values of property-a county or
state equalization rate serves a function entirely distinct from that to
be served by the ratio fixed in inequality cases, and an equalization
rate has no bearing upon the issue presented in such cases. The
assessed valuation of a parcel is 'unequal' if the assessment has been
made 'at a higher proportionate valuation than the assessment of
other property on the same roll by the same officers .' . .. On the other
hand, the 'purpose' sought to be achieved through equalization . . .
'whether the valuations in one tax district bear a just relation to the
valuations in all the tax districts in the county' and the adjustment
of the equalization rates where necessary to establish such 'just
relation.' . . . When the equalization rates are properly adjusted,
the tax imposed on each of the tax districts is justly proportioned to
the value of the taxable property within its limits .... If the rates are
not incorrect in this regard, rough justice is accomplished, for their
purpose is to serve as a base for the allocation of tax burdens, and
benefits, amongst the towns and tax districts. But such rates would
be misleading in an equality case since they do not purport to reflect
the ratio of assessments to value within the tax district itself.10
At the time Yaras was decided, state equalization rates had very limited
uses and were notoriously inadequate. The primary use as indicated by the
court was for the apportionment of taxes in joint districts. For this purpose, the
relationship of rates to current market values was not important so long as rates
were related to a uniform standard. Relative equity could be achieved even
if such a standard were not reasonably current.
Only small amounts of state aid were apportioned on the basis of equaliza-
tion rates and local taxing and borrowing powers were based on the assessed
valuation of taxable real property. Since the state had no significant interest in
equalization rates, little effort was expended on their establishment. It was well
10. 303 N.Y. 224, 230-31, 101 N.E.2d 474, 476 (1951). See also N.Y. Cent. R.R. v.
Manze~la, 7 A.D.2d 173, 181 N.Y.S.2d 280 (4th Dep't 1959), and judge Fuld in more
detail in Smithtown v. Moore, 11 N.Y.2d 238, 183 N.E.2d 66, 228 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1962).
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known during this period that the state rates were not based on scientific studies
and that they were substantially out of date.
When a constitutional amendment which related local taxing and borrow-
ing power to the full value of taxable real property was approved in 1949, the
State Board of Equalization and Assessment was created by the Legislature for
the principal purpose of developing accurate equalization rates based on uniform
and current period price levels for all localities in the state. The Board estab-
lished the first equalization rates based on its statewide statistical studies in
1954. Since that time, state equalization rates have been established annually on
the basis of substantial data obtained from periodic statistical surveys and
uniform period price levels throughout the state.
In 1961 the Legislature amended section 720.3 to permit the introduction
of the equalization rate in inequality trials. Six years later, a taxpayer chose
to rely solely on the equalization rate ignoring the selected parcel method
altogether. The Court of Appeals unanimously held that the equalization rate
standing alone was insufficient evidence to sustain a finding of inequality of a
particular assessment." It seems, therefore, that the 1969 amendment is intended
to override this decision making it clear that the selected parcel method of proof
is not mandated and that either of the alternative methods can be used as
evidence by itself.
The issues in an inequality trial can be reduced if the respondent will by
agreement stipulate the ratio which petitioner sets forth in his demand.12 Even
if agreement as to ratio cannot be obtained by this method, the taxpayer should
still avail himself of the provisions of section 716 of the RPTL just prior to the
inequality trial since the municipality can be charged with the reasonable ex-
penses of the inequality trial where it fails to admit the ratio claimed by the
taxpayer and the taxpayer is successful upon this issue at the trial.13 This is a
standard practice but the taxpayer must choose carefully the ratio he deems
applicable. This can only be effective where he has previously made a thorough
analysis of his and the respondent's selected parcels.
III. T TRIAL OF INEQUALITY-METHODS OF PROOF
Section 720 of the RPTL sets forth the three methods of proof of in-
equality which may be used in an assessment trial. Each of these has singular
characteristics.
A. The Selected Parcel Method
This method is known judicially as the "rough equality" method and by its
critics as the "lottery" method.
[T]he idea of the statute appears to be that a sufficiently
approximate arithmetical mean can be established by pooling a number
11. O'Brien v. Assessor of Town of Mamaroneck, 20 N.Y.2d 587, 232 N.E.2d 844, 28$
N.Y.S.2d 843 (1967).
12. RPTL § 716.1.
13. RPTL § 716.2.
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of parcels (so selected) and comparing the aggregate of their assessed
valuations with the aggregate of their full values. . .. [W] e cannot
say that such a process is inadequate for practical attainment of the
rough equality which is all that has heretofore been possible under
any system of taxation .... 14
To arrive at pure ratio would be an impossibility since such a computation
would require an appraisal or sale of each parcel on the assessment roll on the
taxable status date. The theory of parcel selection is that the parcels represent
a reasonable sample of the entire roll however statistically inaccurate. Using the
selected parcels, the ratio is then computed in the following manner: the total
appraised values serve as the denominator and the total assessed values serve
as the numerator. This mathematical calculation, known as the "dollar ratio"
formula, has been judicially sanctioned despite claims that the proper method
would be to calculate each quotient separately and then take the mean as the
ratio. The latter method Would appear to be more equitable, and is mathe-
matically more precise, but has been rejected by the courts.15
The selected parcel method has serious disadvantages for the taxpayer.
Taxpayers have long been frustrated in their attempts to prove ratio because
of the high cost of the necessary appraisals and the selected parcel method's
built-in advantages on the side of the municipality.'6 Unfortunately even the
most astute taxpayer cannot overcome these advantages.
Commencing with the 1970 tax year, the trial courts must take a new look
at the selected parcel method. It seems clear that should both parties agree to
use this method, the ratio trial and findings will be no different from that which
would have occurred prior to the 1969 amendment. No one can be sure what will
happen, however, where one side (usually the taxpayer) elects to avoid the
selected parcel method and relies instead on one or both of the permissive
methods-actual sales and/or the state equalization rate. Clearly the taxpayer
may now follow such a course safely as far as the burden of proof is concerned,
but he cannot prevent the municipality from requesting the court to make a
selection of parcels to be appraised.
14. People ex rel. Hagy v. Lewis, 280 N.Y. 184, 20 N.E.2d 386 (1939) (emphasis
added).
15. People ex rel. Hagy v. Lewis, 280 N.Y. 184, 20 N.E.2d 386 (1939); People cx rel.
Woolard v. Lewis, 256 App. Div.'872, 10 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1939); Borst v. Board of Assessors
of the City of Amsterdam, 6 Misc. 2d 945, 160 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
16. The advantages which the municipality has are: (1) It may load up its list with
the largest parcels in the district making it economically impossible for the taxpayer to
appraise ten such parcels; for example, in New York City, the respondent could place the
Empire State Building, Chrysler Building and the Pan Am Building on its list. (2) It could
list parcels whose ratios are in excess of 100% while the taxpayer would never find parcels
at or below zero. Parcels assessed at 100% or more over fair market value are common in
any given assessment roll, e.g., old estates (white elephants) and old buildings in slum and
ghetto areas, where property values have dropped almost to zero over the years. (3) It may
add to its list all large new construction, which is generally assessed at or above the state
equalization rate.
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B. The Permissive Method of Introducing the State Equalization Rate
Is the 1969 amendment to section 720.3, which now permits the introduc-
tion of the state equalization rate "whether or not parcels are selected as herein-
above provided," a legislative direction to the courts to give substantial weight
to this evidence in the inequality inquiry?
Despite the earlier judicial criticism of the state equalization rate and the
apparent finality of its rejection when used alone, it may now be viewed as a
superior indicator of ratio when compared to the rough results obtained by
use of the selected parcel method. The state equalization rate is a collection of
sales and appraisal data gathered and preserved by the State Board of Equaliza-
tion over a period of some seven years for each taxing district within the state.
It does not contain, however, an analysis of sales and appraisals which took
place solely during the year under review, since'the primary use of the state
equalization rate is prospective.1
7
In Tilsac v. Town of Huntington,'8 the cover letter from the State Board
of Equalization indicated that the state rate for the Town of Huntington for
1963 was seventeen percent "based upon the simple average of 1959 and 1961
market price level." The accompanying data (introduced in evidence in that
case) contained five tables which indicated the depth of analysis and the
considerable detail involved, all of which supports the contention that the ratio
so determined is much more accurate than the "rough" estimate obtained with
the selected parcel method.' 9
17. But see RPTL §§ 1250-52 mandating current ratios for each year and applicable
solely to the City of New York.
18. 55 Misc. 2d 431, 285 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1967).
19. Table No. 1 broke down the assessment roll by classes of property indicating the
total assessment and market value for each class sampled and the ratio of each class. The
largest classes were sampled until 80% of the assessment roll had been exhausted. Market
values shown for the 1963 rate included only data reflecting 1959 and 1961 price levels.
Table No. 2 indicated the method by which adjustments were made between 1959 and
1961 composite market value ratios based on alleged changes in level of assessments.
Table No. 3 gave 1961 ratios based upon actual sales and appraisal samplings. Where the
sales data were available for a class, they were merged with the appraisal data; otherwise the
ratio was determined for the class on appraisal data only.
Table No. 4 listed appraisals included in the computation. These appraisals were
randomly selected and values were as of 1961. They were then compared to 1960 assess-
ments to obtain a ratio.
Table No. 5 listed the sales that were included in the computation of the rate.
Additional data were introduced in evidence which demonstrated that:
(1) The parcels selected at random are selected specifically within a class.
(2) A sample is so selected that the average assessed value of the sample does not
deviate more than 20% from the average of the assessments for the entire class. A larger
deviation causes rejection of the sample and another sample is then selected.
(3) In gathering the material, the local assessor meets with the state's appraiser and
comments upon the various properties.
(4) All sales which are not bona fide open market transactions are eliminated.(5) If there are less than five sales in a class, the sales are not listed in the computation.
The Board then adjusts the rate computed by use of the 1959 and 1961 data against
the 1958 and 1960 assessments and takes into account alleged increases made by the local
assessor in old assessments. The ratio is adjusted for changes in level of assessments on rolls
completed subsequent to the one used for selecting samples.
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' In recent years, an increasing number of taxpayers have been confronted
by municipalities which have been willing to stipulate ratio only at a percentage
in excess of the state equalization rate. This continues to be the practice even in
jurisdictions where a trial court has made a finding of ratio lower than the state
equalization rate in a particular case.20
C. The Permissive Method of Introducing Actual Sales
The statute permits the introduction in evidence of "actual sales of real
property within the assessing unit that occurred during the year in which the
assessment under review was made. ' 2 1 Even in the tax years when the selected
parcel method was mandatory, actual sales data, if properly documented and
with a properly laid foundation for their introduction, was the more accurate
method for determining ratio.
The selected parcel method calls for appraisals by expert witnesses, and
therefore are merely the informed and educated guesses at what a parcel of land
would sell for in the open market on a given date. What better evidence of fair
market value could there be than from an arms-length, open market sale of such
a parcel?
In practice, actual sales are often the basis for selecting the sample parcels
to be appraised by the selected parcel method. The appraiser, in that event, does
not stray too far from this sales price. The courts, in valuation cases, have long
and repeatedly held that the "price realized on a sale of land made under
ordinary circumstances is evidence of the value of the property at the time of
the sale and of its value at a time near the sale, provided conditions remain
the same .... ,,22 Accordingly, it has been held that actual sales which occurred
within the assessing unit in the year under review are entitled to substantial
weight, 23 although they may be disregarded in the discretion of the trial court
20. Prior to 1960, the Board of Assessors of Nassau County was offering to stipulate
the ratio with individual taxpayers at 40%. From 1962 to 1964, largely as a result of Mid
Island, supra note 5, the Board of Assessors then agreed to stipulate the ratio with taxpayers
at 38%. From 1965 to date, the Board has agreed to stipulate to 331% as the ratio.
Taxpayers' attorneys are pointing to a state equalization rate for the three towns in Nassau
County at 29 and 30%, and have recently requested that such a percentage be stipulated
for 1970. The actual ratio (in the post World War II period of rising sales prices) has been
moving downward each year; however, the state equalization rate is always higher than
current ratio since it weighs and averages previous years ratios for any given later year.
21. RPTL § 720.3. This same provision has remained in the statute and its predeces-
sors for almost 90 years.
22. People ex rel. Four Park Avenue Corp. v. Lilly, 265 A.D. 68, 37 N.Y.S.2d 928
(1942). The actual sales price for which the subject property sold is the best indicator of its
value. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Tax Commission, 18 A.D.2d 612, 234 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1962);
860 Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Tax Commission, 8 N.Y.2d 29, 167 N.E.2d 455 (1960) ; Matter of
City of New York (In re West 205 Street), 240 N.Y. 68, 16 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1925).
23. See People ex rel. Yaras v. Kinnaw, 303 N.Y. 224, 101 N.E.2d 274 (1951), where,
in addition to the selected parcel method, the parties by stipulation submitted a list of
selected sales setting forth and totaling in each instance the aggregate sales prices, the
aggregate assessments and the resultant ratios. The ratio of the taxpayer's sales was 40%
and that of the city 91.7%. The average of both lists was 65%. The referee's finding of
72.4% (based primarily on the selected parcel method) was upheld by the Court of
Appeals reversing the Appellate Division ruling that 85% (the state equalization rate)
572
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where the sales data was "fragmentary and in some instances lacked positive
authentication. '24
D. Selection of Actual Sales by Random Number Sampling
Prior to the 1969 amendment, taxpayers in Mid Island Shopping Plaza v.
Podeyn25 and Tilsac v. Town of Huntington 6 attempted to establish ratio by
introducing evidence of actual sales selected by utilizing a table of random
numbers. This method results in high statistical accuracy by using a relatively
small number of sales to sample a much larger group of sales.27 In each case,
the taxpayer urged Special Term that such a procedure most efficiently and
accurately reflected the roll under review. Both of these cases were tried and
decided when the selected parcel method was still mandatory, but the rationale
of these cases should be just as applicable to post 1969 amendment cases. Mid
Island has gone through the appellate courts. Tilsac has just left Special Term
and requires a more detailed analysis since the evidentiary pattern there de-
veloped was unique.
In 1960, the owners of the Mid Island Shopping Plaza, a large regional
shopping center in Nassau County, prepared for their tax review trial against
the assessors of Nassau County.28 The economics of the proposed ratio trial
should be controlling. In Seneca Hotel Corp. v. Assessors of the City of Geneva, 13 A.D.2d
896 (1961), aff'd 10 N.Y.2d 1031, 275 N.Y.S.2d 48, 180 N.E.2d 435 (1962), all sales which
took place during the year under review were introduced but not appraised, value being
computed by utilizing the documentary stamps attached to the deeds. The ratio of the
sales was 55.5%-that of the selected parcel method 71%. The Appellate Division approved
the referee's adoption of 71% because it was entitled to greater weight in view of the
"expert valuation of the selected parcels."
24. People ex rel. Hagy v. Lewis, 280 N.Y. 184, 20 N.E.2d 386 (1939).
25. 25 Misc. 2d 972, 204 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd 14 A.D.2d 571, 718
N.Y.S.2d 249 (1961), aff'd 10 N.Y.2d 966, 180 N.E.2d 63, 224 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1961).
26. 55 Misc. 2d 431, 285 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
27. Harold Wattel of Hofstra University, the expert for the taxpayer in Tilsac,
described sampling by means of random numbers.
[Slampling is a statistical technique which refers to selecting from a large
population or large universe or a greater number of events . . . .Sampling refers
to plucking from that universe a limited number of cases or limited number of
items.
In the field of statistics, the term probability sampling now refers to a tech-
nique by which any member of that universe has the same likelihood of falling
into your sample as any other unit on that universe. In other words, there is no
bias against any one item in that universe from getting into or out of that sample.
... In order that bias not be introduced, the statistician usually refers to a series
of numbers that have been randomly generated. And using these numbers and
applying a number system to the elements in the universe, he then plucks out the
elements on the basis of his random number system.
This is equivalent to having balls in a cage numbered zero to nine and then
closing your eyes and sticking your hand in and plucking one out, recording that
number. Throwing it back in and starting all over again, so that every one of those
ten balls numbered zero to nine has an equal chance of coming out every time you
stick your hand in.
Record of trial at 395-97, March 18, 1966.
28. In New York, Nassau County is unique in that it is the only non-urban county
which has a County Board of Assessors. Effective January 1, 1970, Tompkins County
established a Review Board charged with the responsibility of adopting a county wide
assessment roll and eliminating all such town, city and village rolls within the county. In all
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plagued them as it had all taxpayers before. The Mid Island owners combined
with the owners of two other regional shopping centers in Nassau County,
Roosevelt Field and Green Acres, to finance the substantial cost of the inequality
trial.29 Conceding to themselves that the selected parcel method would avail
them little or nothing due to the built-in edge favoring the municipality, they
decided to use random sampling to test the entire roll by introducing evidence
of actual sales throughout the assessing unit on a mammoth scale.80
Special Term, confronted with the statute's reference to the actual sales
method, made these interesting findings.
The petitioner has presented 530 transactions chosen blindly and
at random. This far exceeds any number of properties which could
have been selected by the parties and appraised by the experts for both
sides, using the first [mandatory] method set forth in section 293 of
the Tax Law (now 720(3) Real Property Tax Law). The result here
achieved, within the margin of allowable error, seems at least as valid
as any which might be achieved by that method.
This scientific approach to the problem has certain distinct
advantages over the alternate [mandatory] procedure authorized by
the statute. In the latter, opinion evidence of appraisers as to the true
value of the parcels of real estate selected may vary greatly.
Petitioner's method of obtaining a sampling of recorded sales,
utilizes a statistical procedure now universally recognized and applied
in many fields of industry, commerce, science and research.
The use of tables of random numbers reduces to a minimum
the possibility of human error and inclination in the selection of
samples. Moreover, the great number of samples which may be con-
sidered by the use of this method reduces the significance of any
abnormalities which possibly may have been present in some of the
transactions by averaging them out.31
It is obvious that Special Term was intrigued by this innovative method of in-
troducing actual sales.
In affirming, the Appellate Division32 held that actual sales (without limit
as to the amount) may be introduced in evidence in inequality trials and these
sales may have nothing whatever to do with the parcels selected under the
mandatory method. The Court of Appeals also affirmed saying "[i]n view of the
other New York counties, the assessing unit is the town. The cities and villages within the
town either adopt the town roll or maintain their own.
29. The fair market values of each of these regional shopping centers ranged between
$10,000,000 and $20,000,000. In Mid Island, a ratio demand of 36% or less was served and
denied pursuant to RPTL § 716. The County offered to concede a ratio of 407. At the
successful conclusion of the ratio trial with a finding of 35.88%, the county paid some
$25,000 to Mid Island pursuant to the provisions of § 716.2 as "reasonable" expenses
incurred in making such proof. The actual costs claimed by the taxpayer exceeded $50,000.
30. There were several thousand sales that occurred in Nassau County for the year
under review. The sample taken was 530. In this case, the only proof of inequality offered
by either party was the introduction of these sales by the taxpayer, with the added
stipulation agreed to by the County that the "sales prices established by the documentary
stamps on the deeds may be used as evidence of the sales prices."
31. 25 Misc. 2d at 972, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 16, 17.
32. 14 A.D.2d 571, 718 N.Y.S.2d 249 (2d Dep't 1961).
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method adopted and acquiesced in by the parties in trying this proceeding, we
neither reach nor consider the construction of § 720(3) of the Real Property
Tax Law. . ". .. 33 Something new was surely added here. Where the selected
parcel method was not used, actual sales, randomly selected or otherwise, were
permitted to govern the issue of inequality.
In 1967, Tilsac v. Town of Huntington4 posed a unique question to the
court. In an inequality proceeding in which the selected parcel method, the
random sampling of hundreds of actual sales and the state equalization rate
are all utilized, should not the court give the greatest weight to the most ac-
curate sampling of the roll-the random sampling method of actual sales?
While it barely brooks of argument that a sampling group of five hundred sales
or appraisals will more accurately reflect a much larger population than ten or
twenty such similar sales or appraisals, the court found that the taxpayer had
not sustained the burden of proof on the issue of inequality and thus made no
finding nor gave any hint of the answer to the question posed.
In Tilsac, the taxpayer laid its plan of attack perhaps too carefully. It was
aware that the state equalization rate was seventeen percent, the selected parcel
method was loaded against it and the ratio obtained in this manner would
surely be higher than the state rate, and it was sure (from results of test
studies) that pure ratio was between twelve percent and fifteen percent. Armed
with the Mid Island approach of random selection of sales, it sought to deter-
mine the ratio from some 6,600 sales in 1963 by nine hundred samples, 35
simultaneously urging upon the court the superiority of this method and that it
be granted the greatest weight on the issue of inequality.
As expected, the ratio derived from the selected parcels was about 22.5
percent and the state equalization rate was seventeen percent. Neither result
was helpful to the taxpayer. The proof adduced by random selection of all the
sales which took place in 1963 produced a ratio which ranged from 12.85 percent
to 13.35 percent as the taxpayer suspected. However, the court found fault
with the random selection procedure in many respects and rejected this proof of
inequality.
Before actual sales are introduced into evidence, the data must be carefully
authenticated and documented. When working with a single or small group of
sales, the appraiser, before accepting them, must determine that the sale was
bona fide, arms-length, between unrelated parties and that the federal docu-
mentary stamps affixed to the deeds do represent the equity paid over and above
existing mortgages. Once a copy of the deed and any mortgages are obtained,
the balance of the authentication is accomplished by communication with one
of the parties to the transaction or in most cases with the attorney for one of
33. 10 N.Y.2d at 967, 180 N.E.2d at 63, 224 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
34. Supra note 26.
35. Later, an additional 900 samples were selected so that the sampling procedure
ultimately produced some 1800 actual bona fide sales which occurred in 1963.
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the parties to confirm such items as names, size of lots, and sales prices. Where
available, a copy of the contract and closing statement is obtained.
A large number of sales (530 or 1,800)30 makes such authentication
financially infeasible and economically suicidal; resort must be had to other
practical solutions. In Mid Island, by sampling actual conveyances in the
County Clerk's office which were keyed prior to sampling, the taxpayer com-
piled some 340 sales that were recorded during the fiscal period May 1, 1956
through April 30, 1957,37 and compared them with their assessed valuations on
May 1, 1957. In addition, the taxpayer produced for the court every sale in
the county during the same fiscal period in which the consideration was
reported to be $75,000 or more-another 190 sales-for a total of 530 sales.
The respondent stipulated that documentary stamps on the deeds might be used
as evidence of sales price.
In Tilsac, the taxpayer, sampling by random numbers, presented two
separate lists, each consisting of 900 sales, all of which occurred in calendar
year 1963. The sales prices in one sample were compared with the assessment
on June 1, 1962, and in the other list to the assessment for these parcels made
on June 1, 1963. There was no concession from the respondent that the docu-
mentary stamps plus the existing mortgages could be used as evidence of the
sales price .3 Special Term did not rule on the use of documentary stamps as
evidence of value, although the taxpayer's expert witness established that such
stamps proved to be accurate indicators of sales prices in 99 percent of the
cases he had met with in over forty years of such experience.8 9
36. These are the actual number of sales introduced in Mid Island and Tilsac.
37. RPTL § 720.3 permits ". . evidence as to actual sales of real property within
the assessing unit that occurred during the year in which the assessment under review was
made ... ." What is "the year" referred to in the statute? The Legislature gives no further
guidance and no court has ruled upon this issue.
38. However, since the last 55 cents of the documentary stamps affixed to a single deed
might represent a range of $1.00 to $500 of actual consideration paid, each list was amended
by reducing the indicated sale price by a compromise sum of $250 to fairly compensate for
this variable factor.
39. 26 U.S.C. § 4361, prior to its repeal on January 1, 1968, required that the grantor
of real property pay a tax upon the conveyance of real property equal to $.55 for each $500
or part of such sum paid as consideration for the conveyance. Where property is sold
subject to an existing mortgage, the portion of the sales price represented by such mortgage
is not taxable. During the years of the existence of this tax, the stamps annexed to a deed
plus the existing mortgages have become a standard acceptable measuring device to deter-
mine sales prices.
Although the use of documentary stamps has long been accepted as evidence of sales
price when such a sale is used as a "comparable" sale in a valuation proceeding, its ac-
ceptance under the inequality statute has not yet been definitely ruled upon in New York.
In Staten Island Edison v. Moore, 6 Misc. 2d 1031, 164 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1955), rev'd 6
A.D.2d 369, 177 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1958), retried 37 Misc. 2d 198, 238 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1961),
aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 846 (1962), the taxpayer during the first trial introduced 5,000 sales, the
prices ascribed to each being determined from the documentary stamps plus the existing
encumbrances. The appellate division made no comment on this form of proof but re-
versed on other grounds. At the new trial, a new referee completely ignored this sales data.
The affirmances by the appellate courts were made solely to end a seven-year controversy
and no ruling was made upon the use of stamps as proof of sales prices. The New York
County Surrogate held in In re McGeehin's Will, 134 Misc. 334, 235 N.Y.S. 477 (1929)
that "... from the fact that it bears United States Internal Revenue stamps of $1.50, a
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Despite the accuracy of random sampling, Special Term rejected the
method as a proof of inequality. The court's reasons appear to demonstrate a
lack of mathematical knowledge as well as a possible misapplication of the law.
Special Term objected in one instance to the fact that two sales of obviously
improved plots (out of 1800 sales) were compared with assessments of un-
improved land. The ratios thus obtained were inordinately low.4° This type. of
error would, however, be balanced out by similar comparisons in which property
assessed as improved had the improvement destroyed or demolished at the time
of the sale. The court was also concerned that the taxpayer did not see fit to
inform it of the nature of any sale.
[T]he vexing factor is that the court was not advised of the
nature of any given sale. Thus a 100-acre farm, as farmland, will be
assessed as acreage at a much lower amount than would the same
farm broken down into building plots and filed as a map for develop-
ment purposes. So that the mere indication by documentary stamps in
an exhibit that the purchase price of a parcel was $200,000.00 and
the assessment only $5,000.00 (a 2y2 % rate) is not too helpful to
the court. Nor is it necessarily an indication that the assessor had
erred in fixing the original assessment....41
This type of transaction repeats itself throughout all assessment rolls. The
assessor can be wrong or right and his judgment may or may not be success-
presumption is created that he received approximately $3,000 ......
New Jersey, in a statute dealing specifically with real property valuation proceedings,
has provided:
In any proceeding before the board where deeds or other instruments of
conveyance do not state the true consideration or sales price of the property which
is the subject of appeal, the United States documentary stamps attached, if any, to
such deeds or instruments shall be admitted as prima fade evidence of the true
consideration or sales price of the said property.
NJ. STAT. AiN. § 54:3-22 (Supp. 1969).
In Borough of Carteret v. Division of Tax Appeals, 40 N.J. Super. 439, 123 A.2d 549
(1956), the county assessor computed prices of transactions by utilizing the revenue stamps
affixed to the deeds. This use was upheld since their prima fade evidence as such price
was not successfully rebutted by the townships attacking the method.
The Ohio Supreme Court's acceptance of this evidence as a valid basis for determining
sales prices in The State ex rel. The Park Investment Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 175
Ohio St. 410, 195 N.E.2d 908 (1964) was finalized by the Supreme Court of the United
States when the Court denied certiorari. 379 U.S. 818 (1965). Earlier Ohio decisions had
declared this prima fade evidence of sales price to be a rebuttable presumption. Ohio
Turnpike Commission v. Ellis, 164 Ohio St. 377, 131 N.E.2d 397 (1955); Park Investment
Company v. Board of Revision of Cuyahoga County, 115 Ohio App. 523, 179 N.E.2d
784 (1962).
Wisconsin had held documentary stamps to be a rebuttable presumption of actual
consideration paid. Flynn v. Palmer, 270 Wisc. 43, 70 N.W.2d 231 (1955).
See also Grainger Bros. Company v. County Board of Equalization of the County
of Lancaster, 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966); People ex rel. John Enrietta v. Gulf,
Mobile and Ohio R.R. Co., 29 Ill.2d 605, 195 N.E.2d 174 (1963); Schenley Land Co. v.
Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, 205 Pa. Super.
577, 211 A.2d 79 (1965).
40, In compiling the sample, the taxpayer, when confronted with this situation, in
most instances went to the next succeeding tax roll to find an assessment that more nearly
"matched" the sale.
41. 55 Misc. 2d 431, 435, 285 N.Y.S.2d 533, 537-38.
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fully attacked in a tax review proceeding. Merely to suggest that there are
assessments on the roll that are too high or too low or grounded in bad assess-
ment practice is to state the obvious. 42 Special Term should have decided
whether the sampling of the roll by sales selected at random would or would
not accurately reflect that roll. The roll itself might be good, bad or indifferent,
but it is the only roll any court has to work with. To saddle a random sampling
procedure with the inequities of the entire roll would appear to cast an unfair
burden on the taxpayer and would be no less applicable to the "rough" selected
parcel method.
Special Term's rejection of the random sampling procedure sharply raises
the issue of stratification48 and of the taxpayer's failure to demonstrate that
the 1,800 sales introduced in evidence ran the gamut, as it were, of the entire
roll.
In its motion to the trial court for an order selecting the parcels to be
appraised, the taxpayer requested that all 900 sales on its sampling list be
selected.44 In the motion papers, the taxpayer described the Huntington tax roll
as non-homogeneous45 but claimed assuredly that a dozen or two dozen pre-
selected parcels have no chance of accurately reflecting such a roll. Taxpayer
rationally contended that the random sampling method utilizing 900 sales
would present a more accurate picture of the roll because of its inherent di-
versity.
At the trial, Special Term held that this lack of homogeneity rendered the
random sampling by the taxpayer defective. (Statisticians would be universally
befuddled by this statement.) The court buttressed this finding with specific
examples, all of which dealt with the taxpayer's failure to stratify:
(a) No attempt was made to produce sales (if any were made) of
commercial properties valued at more than $50,000 into which tax
category petitioner falls.
(b) Only 35 sales out of the 1,800 were at prices in excess of $50,000
42. See People ex rel. Allen v. Badgley, 138 N.Y. 314, 317, 33 N.E. 1076, 1078
(1893):
It always happens upon every assessment roll that some pieces of property are
assessed at a higher rate of valuation than others, and out of proportion to other
property.... Some property may be assessed at a higher rate than his, and some
at a lower rate; but if upon the whole the average rate of assessment is no lower
than his, and if his assessment is not at a higher rate than assessments generally,
he is not aggrieved within the meaning of the statute.
43. Stratification is the backbone of the compilation of the state equalization rate.
Various classes of property on the roll are sampled by sale and appraisal in each year.
44. This application was denied and each party was directed to submit a list of parcels
in accordance with the selected parcel method.
45. The Huntington tax roll in 1960 contained 47,118 parcels split up into seventeen
different use categories. One and two-family houses represented 70.24% of the total as-
sessed valuation. Some 10,000 parcels were vacant residential land and 160 parcels were
classified as estates, both classes representing 8% of the total assessed valuation. 1774
parcels were zoned commercial and valued at under $50,000 each for 8.81% of the roll.
There were only nineteen commercial parcels valued over $50,000 representing 1.617 of
the assessment roll. The other 12% of the roll consisted of farms, vacant rural land, apart-
ments, industrial utilities and miscellaneous.
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and many of these might have been farm acreage sold for development
purposes.
(c) Not one of the 1,800 odd sales has been identified in any way as
a shopping center or as a large commercial venture.
(d) Almost 20% of one 900 sample consisted of sales of vacant or
semi-vacant land carrying assessments of less than $1,000. "Such
a circumstance throws the random sampling statistics out of kilter
for the obvious reason that almost twenty percent of one sampling
is of property not of the same or similar nature as the subject
property.
Stratification is illegal and may not be used in the inequality trial.46
Section 306 RPTL directs that "[A]ll real property in each assessing unit shall
be assessed at the full value thereof." There is no room therefore for the assess-
ment of any single property on any basis other than at full value, which value
we have shown may be made at a uniform percentage of full value. Section
720.3 of the RPTL specifically prohibits stratification by stating that "the
court . . . shall select the parcels to be appraised without reference to their
assessed value .... 1- The court or referee will not know, nor are they permitted
to know at the pretrial stage of the proceedings, the size of the parcel, if unim-
proved, and the type and size of the improvement where the property is im-
proved. 48 It is abundantly clear that stratification or classification of parcels
on the roll, in the inequality process, may not lawfully be permitted under the
statutes, and the case law in New York and elsewhere amplifies this point.49
46. While conceding that the assessor may not lawfully stratify, it has been suggested
that the parties to an inequality trial may jointly or severally offer up selected parcels and
actual sales for the court on a classification basis. (Conference with Robert Kilmer, Ex-
ecutive Director, New York State Board of Equalization and Assessment February 16,
1970.)
47. Emphasis supplied.
48. A most logical inference is that, in vacant land, the larger parcel will generally be
more valuable and will be assessed accordingly. The zoning of the particular parcel will of
course modify this concept somewhat, i.e., a smaller business zoned parcel may conceivably
be assessed at a higher valuation than a larger piece of farmland acreage. In improved
parcels, the improvement itself will dictate the relative size of the assessment, i.e., a 40-story
office building at many times the assessment of a one-family house.
49. Ratio must be applied uniformly to every type of taxable property. C.H.O.B.
Associates, Inc. v. Nassau County Board of Assessors, 45 Misc. 2d 184 (Sup. Ct. 1964),
aff'd, 22 A.D.2d 1016, 256 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 779, 209 N.E.2d 820, 262
N.Y.S.2d 501 (1965). In this case, the Board of Assessors was advised by a survey that
vacant land in the County was being assessed at 10% and less of its fair market value,
while improved parcels were being assessed at an average ratio of 33M%. The Board, as-
suming that it was obligated by statute and Constitution to assess all real property equally,
whether vacant or improved, and irrespective of class, raised the assessment of some 22,000
parcels of vacant land to one-third of market value. Plaintiff, taxpayer, challenged the
legality of the entire roll. The determination of Special Term, validating the acts of the
assessors, was affirmed on appeal. Special Term at 45 Misc. 2d 186 laid down the fundamen-
tal principles:
Section 306 [Real Property Tax Law] provides that all real property shall be
assessed at full value thereof. Although full value has been held to be synonymous
with market value, the courts have uniformly held that this section does not man-
date assessment at 100% of full or market value. It requires merely that the as-
sessments be at a uniform rate or percentage of full or market value for every
type of property in the assessing unit. The legislature through Section 720(3) of the
579
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
What may be most unusual in Tilsac is that Special Term, while rejecting
randomly selected sales for failure to stratify, did exactly the same in selecting
parcels. Sixteen parcels, eight from each list, were selected by the court "with-
out reference to their assessed values." The twenty-five parcels on each list from
which the court made its statutory selection were preselected by each side for
total value and for low and high ratios respectively. No further distinction
concerning types and classes was made by either side or by the court.50
Actually, the sixteen parcels selected there broke down into the following
classes: four small commercial parcels, four large old residential estates, five
vacant residential lots, two partly constructed residences and one one-family
residence.
One final word on stratification. Special Term made this pertinent finding:
While we are told that all properties should be assessed at a
uniform rate it is apparent that in Huntington, the rule is more
honored in the breach than in the observance.61
Thus, despite its illegality, stratification may be practically desirable in a
sampling of an admitted or obviously stratified roll.52 Is it not reasonable to
assume that a random sampling of some 1,800 parcels, as adduced in Tilsac,
Real Property Tax Law has acknowledged and apparently sanctioned this state-
wide practice.
In Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923), the Supreme Court of
the United States has held that all real property within a state must be assessed at full
value or a uniform percentage thereof, else there will be a denial of the equal protection
provision of the fourteenth amendment.
This is the general view throughout the United States, where it is held that, absent an
express authorization in the state Constitution sanctioning assessments at varying rates for
different classes of real property, all property must be assessed at the same rate. But see
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940). Thus,
where the state constitution directs all property to be assessed at "market value," "full
value," "fair cash value" or other similar language, an equality of rate is required and
classification or stratification of the assessment roll is deemed unconstitutional.
The various state constitutions, statutes and decisions throughout the United States
are collected in Note, Inequality in Property Tax Assessments: New Cures for an Old 111,
75 HAv. L. Rav. 1374 (1962). See generally, Comment, Tax Assessments of Real Property:
A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68 YArn L.J. 335, 348 (1958).
50. Tilsac v. Town of Huntington, 55 Misc. 2d 431, 432, 285 N.Y.S.2d 533, 534-39
(Sup. Ct., 1967).
51. Id. at 438, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
52. But see New York City Administrative Code, § 166-1.0(b) (3), which is ap-
plicable only to the City of New York, and specifically authorizes stratification and gives
an election to the taxpayer on the issue of inequality.
Such [judicial] review shall be allowed only on one or more of the following
grounds, which must be specified in such petition: . . . That the assessment is
erroneous by reason of inequality, in that it has been made at a higher propor-
tionate valuation than the assessment of other real property of like character in
the same ward or section, or other real property on the assessment rolls of the city
for the same year, specifying the instances in which such inequality exists and the
extent thereof, and stating that the petitioner is or will be injured thereby. (em-
phasis added).
Thus in New York City at least, the taxpayer is given the choice of the comparable
parcels under the selected parcel method. He may compare his property with "property of
like character in the same ward or section" or other real property on the assessment roll.
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would contain a built-in stratification, as it were, assuredly more so than the
sixteen court-selected parcels?
Special Term compared the Tilsac parcel with a neighbor's land on the
issue of inequality, a practice long interdicted by the appellate courts.
Skyline Woods, a residential community, is adjacent to the sub-
ject property. It was carved out of the same original land acquisition
and was developed at about the same time as Big H [name of
Tilsac's shopping center]. Being aware of this, the court looked for
and found sales listings, five in number, on Exhibit 40 (taxpayer's
second list of 900 sales). They are items 145, 148, 191, 244 and 440.
All are improved properties. They show an aggregate assessment of
$19,925-and a total sales price of $112,450. This works out to an
assessment of 17.7% with respect both to dollar value and average
of ratios.
This is some indication that on the argument of inequality no
discrimination was practiced against the Big H.53
Having made this irrelevant and erroneous comparison, Special Term
quoted with approval Wolf v. Town of Hanover- (where the Court of Appeals
gave the reasons why such a comparison is irrelevant), and in the process
directly contradicted itself.
The reason why a mere comparison of the assessment of a neigh-
bor's property is irrelevant, and why the question is solely one of
comparative rate of assessment, is evident when the purpose of an
inequality proceeding is borne in mind. This court long ago held that
the injustice to be redressed in such a proceeding is discriminatory
assessing which has the effect of compelling the taxpayer to pay more
than his due share of the aggregate tax; that is, the levy on all the
taxpayers in the entire district. See People ex rel. President, etc.,
Delaware and Hudson Canal Co. v. Ganley, 131 N.Y. 566, 30 N.E.
64; People ex rel. Warren v. Carter ... 109 N.Y. 576, 17 N.E. 222.
But that grievance may not be established simply by showing an
underassessment of neighbor A's property. As Judge Andrews, writing
for the court in the Warren case, put it, 'If a particular piece of
property (e.g. neighbor A's) on an assessment roll is undervalued,
another (e.g. neighbor B's) may be correspondingly overvalued'.
109 N.Y. at pages 580-581, 17 N.E. at page 224. In such circum-
stances, the subject property would be bearing no greater than its due
proportionate share of the total tax burden and, as indicated, the
petitioner would have no cause or basis for complaint.55
Is not Special Term's comparison therefore to the neighbor (Skyline Woods) at
a ratio of approximately seventeen percent (coincidentally the state equaliza-
tion rate and the purported ratio used by the assessor when making the Tilsac's
53. 55 Misc. 2d 431, at 436, 285 N.Y.S.2d 533, at 540-41 (emphasis added).
54. 308 N.Y. 416, 126 N.E.2d 539 (1954).
55. Id. at 421-22, 126 N.E.2d at 541.
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assessment in the first instance) " proscribed by Judge Andrews in the Warren
case? 57
In Tilsac, Special Term asserts that the "coup de grace to random sampling"
was delivered when the taxpayer failed to prove that the 1,800 actual sales intro-
duced, accurately or otherwise, reflected the actual assessment roll. 8 Con-
cededly the sixteen sales utilized pursuant to the selected parcel method do not
reflect the actual roll. Yet this method is mandated by the legislature and is
decreed to represent the roll. The legislature permits the introduction of actual
sales which occurred during the year in which the assessment under review
was made. Is it not manifestly unfair to place such a burden on the actual
sales (here many more in number and by their very numbers, more likely to
accurately represent the actual roll) when the selected parcel method is legis-
latively immune from such an attack? It would seem that such actual sales
should be accepted as representing the roll just as effectively (if not more so) as
do the selected parcels.
IV. Tim PROGNosis
In most cases, the taxpayer will reject the selected parcel method and,
depending on his financial status, elect to rely upon the state equalization rate
or the actual sales method or both. The municipality will still opt primarily for
the selected parcel method, but might in a proper case put the state equalization
rate in evidence as well.
New York's solution to the judicial determination of inequality has long been
unique among the states.59 In the past, it has provided the courts with that
"rough equality," which has been held to be the aim of inequality trials.
Have recent decisions and the new amendment to section 720.3 of the
RPTL helped the parties to narrow this "rough equality"?
We have shown that:
56. In Tilsac, the town assessor was called by the taxpayer as a witness. Special
Term commented on his method of assessment: "As to finished products, it was his custom
(and allegedly good assessment procedure) to use three criteria for assessments. There were
(1) the state equalization rate, (2) the value of adjoining or comparable properties, and
(3) replacement costs less depredation. If he could not fit the property comfortably into
this tri-partite Procrustean bed, then he would cut the body accordingly by giving weight
to two of the three indicated criteria. . . ." 55 Misc. 2d 431, 435, 285 N.Y.S.2d 533, 537
(1967).
The court's amusing comment on the assessor's method fails to indicate that as far as
the taxpayer's burden in such a trial is concerned, the assessor could just as well have
thrown a dart into the wall to come up with a number. It is the total assessment that is
under review-the number only-and how the assessor arrived at such a number is not
the subject nor the proper inquiry of judicial review. It is of interest to note, however,
that while the assessor considered both the cost and market approach to value (which he
then clearly multiplied by the state rate of 17%), he did not include in his Procrustean bed
the third approach to value, the income or economic approach. In all fairness to the
assessor, the courts have really added this approach for them in many of the recent tax
review decisions, wherein reductions have been granted.
57. Warren v. Carter, 109 N.Y. 576, 17 N.E. 222 (1888).
58. 55 Misc. 2d 431, at 441, 285 N.Y.S.2d 533, at 541.
59. See Note, HARv. L. Rzv., supra note 49 at 1383.
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1. It is no longer necessary for the taxpayer to acquiesce in the selected
parcel method, despite the fact that the municipality desires to travel that road.
2. The taxpayer and the municipality may introduce the state equaliza-
tion rate as evidence of ratio without concurrent compliance with the selected
parcel method.
3. Either side may introduce evidence of actual sales as evidence of ratio
without concurrent compliance with the selected parcel method.
With this type of evidence before it, what will a hypothetical trial court of
the future look for to aid its decision? It may not reject the taxpayer's proof
for failure to comply with the selected parcel method. It may accept the ap-
praisal of selected parcels by the municipality as that "rough equality," and
reject the state rate and the actual sales. It may, however, reject the selected
parcel results on the ground that it is too "rough" and it may accept the state
equalization rate or the results from the actual sales or both. The Court of
Appeals will have to tell us which method is to be accorded the greatest weight
because there is no legislative directive and the earlier decisions have not re-
solved the question.60
The Court will probably not give up the selected parcel method gracefully.
The argument over the state equalization rate, as long as Judge Fuld has a
voice, may continue to rage. However, where the state equalization rate is
buttressed by detailed documentation readily supplied by the State Board of
Equalization, together with an expert witness, we may expect a more favorable
decision from Judge Fuld on the weight to be accorded the rate.
One graceful way out for the Court, it would seem, would be over the road
of actual sales, and in sales-active locales, selection of these sales may be made
by means of random numbers. When justified by the economics of the valuation
trial and where resort is first had to the statutory protection (where a success-
ful taxpayer may assess the costs of the ratio trial against the municipality), it
is recommended that the taxpayer emphasize the actual sales method. Research
has disclosed that this method will result in a ratio that most properly reflects
pure ratio. 61 Where these sales are well authenticated and documented, the ratio
thus obtained should be accorded substantial weight.
60. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Assessor of Town of Mamaroneck, 20 N.Y.2d 587, 232 N.E.2d
844, 285 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1967).
61. Pure ratio is a ratio well below the state equalization rate and far below the
results obtained by the selected parcel method. The assessor's oath requires him to fairly
assess in each year every parcel at a uniform percentage of fair or full value. The municipal-
ity should have no cause for complaint where a finding is made to square with logic and
the immutable fact that ratio is dropping each year in an era of rising sales prices.

